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Blurring Boundaries: A Comparative Analysis of Public-Private Law Dichotomy in the Age of Environmental Protection

Abstract

This article offers a comparative analysis of the evolving relationship between public and private law across different legal traditions in the context of globalization and environmental challenges. By examining the historical development from Roman law to contemporary jurisprudence, it contrasts the European-continental approach, which traditionally maintains a rigid separation between these spheres, with the common law perspective, where the distinction rests primarily on the nature of protected interests. The study compares different models of constitutional review—the Anglo-Saxon judicial review and the Kelsenian centralized control—highlighting their progressive hybridization in systems like Italy’s. The comparative framework extends to environmental protection approaches, juxtaposing compensatory and restorative models while analyzing how various legal systems have constitutionalized environmental values. The article further explores the methodological shift from formalistic to functional interpretative approaches across jurisdictions, demonstrating how contemporary legal systems are converging toward hybrid solutions that transcend traditional categorizations. This comparative perspective reveals that the erosion of boundaries between public and private law represents not a crisis of legal identity but rather a necessary adaptation to the complex challenges of modern governance, particularly in addressing environmental imperatives that require integrated regulatory frameworks.

Parole chiave
  • Comparative legal system
  • hybridization of law
  • environmental regulation
  • environmental damage
  • constitutional environmental protection
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Hans Kelsen, in his famous essay of 1924, questions the ontological distinction between public and private law, highlighting its artificial and historically conditioned character1. His critique, deeply rooted in the general theory of law, opposes the dominant conception in the European-continental legal tradition, which sees the separation between the two spheres as a founding principle of the legal system. Kelsen unmasks the groundlessness of this dichotomy, showing how the normative foundation is unitary and how the distinction between public and private is nothing more than a product of legal systematics, rather than an intrinsic reality of law.2

This approach, although innovative for its time, takes on renewed relevance today. The increasing permeability between public and private law is manifested in many areas: the constitutionalisation of private law, the public regulation of the market, the spread of private instruments in administrative action and the growing incidence of supranational sources have made the boundaries between the two categories increasingly blurred. Kelsen’s idea that private law is not a neutral and autonomous space, but an eminently political dimension, is reflected in the current debate on the regulation of private powers and the need for regulatory instruments capable of rebalancing the asymmetries of power in contractual relations.3

However, Kelsenian thought also shows elements of outdatedness. His conception of private law as a form of democratic normative production appears today inadequate to grasp the transformations of society and its new needs, which can be summarised in the need to protect the environment, in its broadest possible sense, and future generations. Mass contracting, the dominant role of digital platforms and the growing concentration of economic power have highlighted how market dynamics, moreover, are moving away from the model of parity on which Kelsenian theory was based.4 Private law, far from being a sphere of free self-determination, is increasingly regulated by publicist interventions aimed at rebalancing negotiating positions and ensuring effective protection of weaker contracting parties.

Within this framework, Kelsen’s critique retains a strong heuristic capacity, offering useful tools for understanding the decline of the dichotomy between public and private law. However, his approach needs updating in the light of the transformations of the global economy and the new forms of legal regulation, which make it increasingly difficult to apply rigidly the traditional categories of legal dogmatics.5

Thus, we can record that the evolution of the contemporary legal system is characterised by a phenomenon of progressive erosion of the traditional boundaries between public and private law, a complex and multiform process that is redrawing the fundamental coordinates of legal experience.6

The distinction between public and private law is a constant in the various legal traditions, although it has been the subject of varying formulations and interpretations over time7. Already in Roman law, authors such as Ulpianus, Gaius and Cicero outlined articulated conceptions, united by the idea that public law protects collective interests and is characterised by the exercise of authoritative power by the public subject against the private party, whereas private law is based on equality between the parties and the realisation of individual interests8. This approach has become entrenched throughout history, with the exception of common law, where the distinction is not based on a different regulatory regime, but exclusively on the nature of the interests pursued.9

Beginning in the 1960s, doctrine – particularly civil law doctrine – began a process of revising dogmatic conceptions, shifting the focus to the role of constitutional norms in relations between private individuals10. Private autonomy ceased to be considered an independent sphere, being progressively limited by typically public legal instruments. At the same time, the alleged equality of contractual positions has been called into question in cases where one party holds preponderant bargaining power11. Against this backdrop, the legal debate at the end of the 20th century began to question the persistence of the dichotomy between public and private law, while case law continued to reflect traditional categories without anticipating doctrinal change.

2. Overcoming the public-private dichotomy in post-modern law12

In the context of post-modern law, every dogmatic category, including the major conceptual divisions, is subject to critical revision. The boundary between public and private law, already made mobile by the transformations of the 20th century, has further weakened with the beginning of the new millennium. On the one hand, the constitutionalisation of private law has consolidated the application of constitutional principles in interprivate relations, even if the discussion on their direct application or mediated through general clauses such as good faith and public order remains open13. On the other hand, the expansion of supranational sources has produced a progressive Europeanisation of private law, leading to an overall reconsideration of the regulatory system.14

A further development is the so-called ‘privatisation’ of public law, which sees the use of private instruments for the pursuit of public goals and for the regulation of relations between administrations and private parties. In the economic context, the debate has shifted to the state’s ability to govern the market and the possibility of a law independent of state regulation.

These processes testify to the decline of the traditional distinction between public and private law. The transformations of post-modern law have made it increasingly uncertain whether it is possible to draw a clear line of demarcation between the two spheres, undermining the legal certainty that classical categories guaranteed in previous eras.15

This hybridisation process represents one of the most significant transformations of the legal landscape in recent decades, as highlighted by the most recent case law and masterfully theorised by Stefano Rodotà.16

The traditional conception that, as we have seen, saw a clear separation between the public and private spheres has undergone a profound transformation, as is clear from the most recent case law. Among the decisions that corroborate this view, we can cite Judgement No. 3041 of 2016 of the Council of State17 that elaborated a “changing” and “functional” conception of the legal nature of subjects and their activities, emphasising how the very notion of public entity is no longer static and immutable, but is configured as a dynamic concept that can vary depending on the regulatory and functional context. This evolution finds further confirmation in the recent Order No. 15911 of 2024 of the United Sections of the Italian Supreme Court18, which reiterated how the criterion for qualifying an entity can no longer be merely formalistic but must consider the substance of the activities performed and the ratio of the regulatory interventions. This orientation fully reflects the thought of Rodotà, who theorised a progressive ‘publicisation’ of private law and a parallel ‘privatisation’ of public law. The thinning of the boundaries between public and private is particularly evident in the field of participated companies and public services. As pointed out by the Civil Cassation in Order No. 11265 of 202019 , even when there are forms of public control, the companies maintain their own legal and patrimonial autonomy, in a delicate balance between a private nature and public purposes. The Civil Cassation, in Judgment No. 22209 of 201320, identified some key factors of this evolution, including the abandonment of a merely authoritative conception of the Public Administration and the adoption of a functional perspective oriented towards the protection of the public interest, accompanied by a growing trust in the regulatory capacities of the market. Particularly significant is the position of the Constitutional Court, which, in Judgement no. 152 of 202421, emphasised the principle of subsidiarity and the recognition of associative forms for the performance of activities of general interest, echoing Rodotà’s vision of a civil law open to instances of solidarity and social functionality.

Judgment no. 152/2024, moreover, is also particularly relevant from a procedural-civil law perspective, as highlighted by the recent Order no. 19452 of 15 July 2024 of the United Sections of the Italian Supreme Court22 , which specifically addressed jurisdiction profiles in the matter of environmental damage. In fact, the Supreme Court clarified that the attribution to the ordinary judge of the jurisdiction of disputes concerning compensation for environmental damage represents a constitutionally legitimate legislative choice, which meets the need to ensure effective and complete judicial protection. This orientation was further strengthened by judgment no. 8826 of 3 April 2024 of the Third Civil Section23, which outlined an articulated system of procedural protection, in which the action for compensation for environmental damage is configured as a complementary instrument of protection with respect to the other remedies provided by the system. In this framework, the protection of the environment is achieved through an integrated procedural system, in which the various forms of protection – injunctive, compensatory and restorative24 – combine to ensure effective protection of the environment, confirming the nature of primary constitutional value that recent legislative and jurisprudential developments have definitively recognised.25

3. The hybridisation of law: constitutional foundations and environmental protection

This hybridisation process has a constitutional basis in Articles 4226 and 4327 of the Constitution, which introduced the concept of the social function of ownership and provided for the possibility of public intervention in strategic economic sectors. This constitutional basis has allowed the development of hybrid forms of management, as evidenced by Article 17 of the Consolidated Law on Publicly Owned Companies (Testo unico in materia di società a partecipazione pubblica)28, which regulates mixed public-private companies. This aspect clearly highlights the process of evolution of the law and how, in various areas of law, both procedural and substantive, the public-private dichotomy outlined at the outset is an increasingly blurred and unmarked boundary. This evolution is not, therefore, a mere confusion of legal categories, but rather an evolutionary response to the growing complexities of contemporary society. As theorised by Rodotà, this process requires a new legal grammar capable of combining individual autonomy with the requirements of social cohesion, property rights with instances of solidarity, contractual freedom with responsibility towards the community29. This evolution requires a dynamic and functional interpretative approach that goes beyond the rigid traditional categorisations to embrace a more complex and articulated vision of the legal phenomenon, in which public and private are no longer separate spheres but complementary dimensions of a single regulatory system oriented towards the effective protection of the rights and interests of the community.30

The transformation of the relationship between public and private law is particularly evident in civil liability, where there is a progressive publicisation of the interests protected. As highlighted by the Civil Cassation in Judgment No. 7513 of 201831, the restorative function of damages is increasingly accompanied by deterrence and prevention purposes, typical of public law. This judgment, while mainly dealing with non-asset damage in the general civil law context, has interesting connections with environmental protection, especially from the perspective of personal injury resulting from environmental damage.
In the context of environmental law, the principle expressed by the Court of Cassation on the non-duplication of damage can be applied when assessing injuries suffered by individuals due to environmental damage.

For example, in the case of damage to health caused by pollution, a distinction must be made:
1. Biological damage resulting from exposure to harmful substances or alteration of the environment (quantifiable through medico-legal assessment);           

2. The dynamic-relational prejudices that are a direct consequence of the biological damage and therefore already included in its quantification.

3. The additional and autonomous prejudices, such as the subjective moral damage linked to the awareness of living in a polluted environment or the existential damage resulting from the need to change one’s lifestyle due to environmental degradation.32      

This distinction is particularly relevant in environmental compensation actions, where they are often intertwined:       

– Injunctive protection (to stop the polluting activity); 

– Restorative protection (for environmental restoration);        

– Compensatory protection for personal injury.33           

In this context, the principle of non-duplication is fundamental for a correct quantification of the damage, avoiding overlapping between the various items of damage but at the same time guaranteeing full compensation for all the injuries actually suffered, including those which, although connected to environmental damage, have their own conceptual autonomy and therefore require autonomous assessment and settlement. This interpretation is in line with the evolution of jurisprudence in environmental matters, which tends increasingly to recognise the multidimensionality of environmental damage and its repercussions on the personal sphere of individuals, while maintaining the need to avoid duplication of compensation.

4. Other areas of overlap between public and private law: public contracts, common goods and fundamental rights.

Another significant area of this evolution is public contract law, where the administration increasingly acts iure privatorum, while maintaining public interest constraints and purposes. Council of State Judgment No. 4614 of 201734 highlighted how even in the executive phase of the contract, traditionally dominated by private law, there remain publicist elements linked to the need to guarantee the general interest. Particularly emblematic is the case of common goods, a conceptual category that transcends the public-private dichotomy. As emphasised by the United Sections of the Supreme Court in Judgment No. 3665 of 201135, these assets are characterised by a collective functionality that goes beyond the formal ownership of the right of ownership, requiring forms of participatory management that go beyond the traditional distinction between public and private management. It is important to remember that Judgement No. 3665 predates by 11 years the introduction of Constitutional Law. 1/2022, which amended Articles 9 and 42 of the Constitution. However, Italian jurisprudence has always guaranteed a high level of environmental protection. Perhaps the canon of interpretation of the 2022 constitutional reform should be overturned, highlighting how it was precisely a decades-long stratification of environmental protection in jurisprudence that led to an accomplished constitutional reform, capable of affecting even one of the articles of the fundamental principles. The phenomenon of hybridisation also manifests itself in the field of the protection of fundamental rights, where the Constitutional Court, in Judgment No. 85 of 201336, elaborated the concept of ‘dynamic balancing’ between constitutionally protected interests, overcoming the rigid opposition between individual rights and public interest. In the field of economic regulation, as highlighted by the Civil Cassation in Judgment No. 1465 of 201937, there is a growing intermingling of private instruments and public purposes, with the emergence of ‘reflexive’ forms of regulation that see the active participation of the regulated subjects in the definition of the rules. This evolution has led to the emergence of new subjective figures, such as public law bodies and in-house companies, that escape traditional categorisations. The United Sections of the Supreme Court of Cassation, in Judgment No. 16741 of 201738, highlighted how these figures require a substantive approach that looks at the actual nature of the activity carried out rather than the legal form adopted, therefore, the importance of the ruling is first and foremost manifested in its interpretative approach to procedural rules, where the Court establishes that, in the absence of a specific discipline (even in traditionally public law cases), the general rules of the Code of Civil Procedure apply.

Significant is also the development in the field of the liability of directors of public companies, where the Civil Cassation, in its judgment no. 25038 of 201339, developed evaluation criteria that take into account both the private nature of the management activity and the publicistic purposes pursued. This ruling marked an important moment in Italian law as it marks a fundamental turning point in the conception of the liability of directors of public companies, introducing an interpretative approach that goes beyond the mere private dimension of management activity. The Court has in fact established that the assessment of directors’ actions cannot be based solely on criteria of economic efficiency typical of private law, but must necessarily also take into account the public purposes pursued by the company; this latter aspect, as we shall see below, is of fundamental importance for the pursuit of the values of protection of the environment, health and the new generations. The thinning of the boundary between public and private law is also evident in the area of consumer protection, where the Civil Cassation in its judgment No. 21255 of 201340 highlighted how the protection of the weaker contracting party responds to public economic order requirements that transcend the merely private dimension of the contractual relationship. This evolution requires a rethinking of the traditional legal categories and instruments of protection. As emphasised by Rodotà, it is necessary to develop new forms of governance capable of combining market efficiency with the protection of collective interests, freedom of economic initiative with social responsibility, private autonomy with the requirements of public regulation. The process of hybridisation between public and private law should not be seen as a loss of identity of the respective spheres, but rather as a necessary evolution to respond to contemporary challenges. Indeed, the complexity of social and economic relations requires flexible and adaptable legal instruments capable of overcoming the rigidity of traditional categorisations in order to guarantee effective protection of the rights and interests at stake.        

In this perspective, the role of the jurist becomes that of architect of innovative solutions, capable of combining public and private elements according to the objectives to be pursued. As the most recent case law has shown, this reconstruction work must be guided by the constitutional principles of solidarity and subsidiarity, which represent the balance between the different souls of the legal system.

5. From dichotomy to dialogue: the evolution of the relationship between public and private law in environmental protection and the overcoming of merely restorative actions

In the field of environmental protection, the Criminal Court of Cassation in its judgment No. 4675 of 201441 emphasised how environmental protection requires a synergy between public and private instruments, with an increasing role of private autonomy in the realisation of purposes of general interest. We see how the phenomenon of environmental protection is no longer confined to administrative law and, thanks also to the reform that took place with the introduction of Article 452 bis of the Criminal Code42 environmental liability has also been given criminal relevance. In the specific case of this judgment, it is important to mention it for the principle it states that will become subsequently an indispensable parameter for all those proceedings that will have an environmental implication. In fact, the pivotal principle established by the judgment concerns the need for a rigorous, punctual and analytical ascertainment, free of approximations in legal assessment. This methodological approach has become paradigmatic in subsequent environmental jurisprudence, where precision in the ascertainment of conduct detrimental to the ecosystem is crucial for effective environmental protection.

The evolution of the relationship between public and private law, therefore, finds in environmental protection one of its most significant and complex areas of manifestation. As highlighted by the Council of State’s ruling No. 3041 of 201643, the current legal system is characterised by a growing complexity in which the boundaries between public and private are becoming increasingly blurred, especially when it comes to environmental protection. This transformation manifests itself through a twofold dynamic: on the one hand, private instruments are used to pursue environmental protection goals of public interest; on the other hand, public entities are increasingly adopting private law operational forms in the management of environmental issues.

The Constitutional Court, with judgment no. 126 of 201644, made a decisive contribution to this evolution, elaborating a conception of the environment as an autonomous and dynamic legal asset, which requires integrated and multilevel forms of protection where it is stated that ‘the environment cannot be considered a mere material asset subject to public or private property, but must be qualified as a constitutionally protected value , which outlines a sort of transversal matter in relation to which different competences are manifested that may well be regional, with the State being responsible for the determinations that respond to needs deserving of uniform regulation throughout the national territory’. This view was further confirmed in the very recent judgment no. 105 of 202445, where the Court extended the perspective of environmental protection to future generations, configuring it as an ethical and legal duty of preservation that transcends the traditional public-private dichotomy.

Indeed, the Court stated that ‘the protection of the environment, biodiversity and ecosystems constitutes a primary and absolute constitutional value which, as such, must be regarded as a limitation on the exercise of other constitutionally guaranteed rights, including private economic initiative’. The Court also emphasised that ‘the protection of the environment in the interest of future generations represents an imperative duty which transcends the individualistic dimension of rights and is projected into a diachronic dimension of collective responsibility’. In this ruling of 2024, it is evident how the constitutional semantics introduced and crystallised in our system by Constitutional Law no. 1/2022 has fully generated the constitutional semantics of the environment. 1/2022 has fully generated its scope in the environmental field46. The principle of integration between environmental protection and other public policies finds a full elaboration in the Council of State’s ruling no. 1823 of 202347, which emphasises the need to overcome a model of parallel protections in favour of an integrated approach that considers environmental needs as a transversal element of every public policy. The recent Constitutional Court ruling no. 152 of 202448 added a further piece to this evolution, highlighting how the subject of civil law necessarily has to deal with a dynamic conception of legal relations in which environmental protection assumes a central and transversal role.

As recalled several times in this chapter, Constitutional Law no. 1/2022 marked a momentous turning point in the relationship between environmental protection and economic initiative, profoundly redefining the constitutional framework by amending Articles 9 and 41 of the Constitution. As also highlighted by the Constitutional Court in sentence no. 105 of 202449, this reform elevated the protection of the environment, biodiversity and ecosystems to a primary and absolute constitutional value, introducing an intergenerational dimension to environmental protection that transcends the traditional individualistic conception of rights. Article 9, as already highlighted, in its new formulation is no longer limited to the protection of the landscape, but explicitly includes the protection of the environment, biodiversity and ecosystems ‘in the interest of future generations’, while Article 41 has been amended to explicitly include the environment among the limits to private economic initiative. As emphasised by the Constitutional Court in its judgment no. 152 of 2024, this evolution does not represent a mere formal change, but a structural rethinking of the relationship between economic initiative and environmental values, configuring a new constitutional paradigm in which the environment is no longer a mere external limit to economic activity, but a founding value that must guide and qualify the entire economic-productive system with a view to sustainability and intergenerational responsibility. 
This regulatory and jurisprudential evolution outlines a process of progressive hybridisation between public and private law in which the environment takes on the role of an ordering and reconciling element. It is no longer an object of contention between opposing legal spheres, but a terrain of convergence and shared responsibility, requiring an overall rethinking of traditional legal categories in favour of collaborative and systemic models of protection.

This profound transformation of the regulatory and value framework necessarily reflects on the level of civil procedural protection, requiring a rethinking of traditional procedural tools to adapt them to the new constitutional dimension of environmental protection. Referring again to Judgment No. 105 of 2024, the elevation of the environment to a primary and absolute constitutional value requires a reconfiguration of the civil process in a systemic and preventive key, overcoming the traditional merely restorative approach. The procedural tools must now be interpreted and applied in the light of the principles of environmental action and sustainable development enshrined in Articles 3-ter50 and 3-quater of the Environmental Code51, favoring forms of anticipatory protection and procedural mechanisms that allow a prospective assessment of environmental impacts. The intergenerational dimension of environmental protection also requires a broadening of the traditional categories of legal standing and interest in legal action, to allow for the procedural representation of future and widespread interests. The civil trial thus becomes no longer just a forum for the settlement of inter-subjective conflicts, but a tool for environmental governance and the preventive protection of ecosystem balances, in a perspective that goes beyond the public-private dichotomy to embrace an integrated and systemic vision of the judicial protection of the environment.

6. Jurisprudence in the service of the environment: reflections on the qualification of damage

The qualification of environmental and climate damage represents one of the most complex challenges in contemporary law, lying at the intersection of constitutional law and civil procedure, in a regulatory context profoundly renewed by the constitutional reform of 2022. The constitutional dimension of environmental protection has now been fully realised with the reform that took place with Constitutional Law no. 1/2022, which elevated the protection of the environment, biodiversity and ecosystems to a primary constitutional value, also introducing an intergenerational perspective in environmental protection.

 The Constitutional Court, with the aforementioned judgment no. 126 of 201652, made a fundamental contribution to the qualification of environmental damage, defining it as an injury to a fundamental public interest that transcends the merely patrimonial dimension to place itself in a perspective of collective protection. This approach was further confirmed in subsequent case law, which progressively elaborated a three-dimensional conception of environmental damage, encompassing the personal, social and public dimensions.

 On a regulatory level, Article 300 of the Environment Code53 provides an articulated definition of environmental damage, qualifying it as any significant and measurable deterioration of a natural resource or the utility provided by it. This definition is further specified by Article 306-bis54 , which introduces specific criteria for the determination of remedial measures, divided into primary, complementary and compensatory.

 The Civil Cassation, with Order No. 23647 of 202055, consolidated the principle of strict liability for environmental damage, establishing that it exists regardless of the subjective element, provided that the causal link between the conduct and the damage is proven. This approach was further reinforced by Judgment No. 8468 of 201956, which outlined important procedural profiles, including the need to allege and prove concrete environmental damage.

In terms of procedural legitimacy, Article 313 of the Environment Code57 gives the Ministry of the Environment exclusive jurisdiction for the action for compensation for environmental damage, while Article 29958 defines the ministerial competences according to a collaborative model with the territorial entities. The quantification of environmental damage is one of the most complex aspects of the matter. Article 1226 of the Civil Code59 on the equitable assessment of damage assumes particular relevance when specifying the amount is particularly difficult. The Lombardy Regional Administrative Court, in its judgment no. 1957 of 201360, emphasised the ‘off-the-shelf’ nature of the environment, which must be assessed in its collective use value.

 The Civil Cassation, in its judgment no. 9012 of 201561, has definitively sanctioned the shift from a merely compensatory logic to a restorative one, establishing that environmental damage can only be repaired through primary, complementary and compensatory remedial measures. This evolution reflects the growing awareness of the need for an integrated approach to environmental protection, which considers not only the economic but also the ecological and social aspects of damage. The qualification of environmental and climate damage is thus an evolving legal institution, which requires an interdisciplinary approach and constant attention to the new challenges posed by the climate crisis and the need to ensure effective protection of the environment for future generations.

The evolution of environmental protection in civil proceedings is part of the broader context of the transformation of the interpretative role of common judges, who through constitutionally oriented interpretation have contributed to redefining the boundaries between public and private law. This evolution finds its historical roots in Calamandrei’s thought and has developed through a path that has progressively eroded the rigid separation between models of constitutional justice.62

In fact, “the well-established practice of constitutionally adequate interpretation by common judges of legislative source norms probably has its remote cause in Article 2 of Piero Calamandrei’s report on judicial power and the Supreme Constitutional Court presented to the Commission for the Constitution – Second Subcommittee, which provided: ‘Judges in the exercise of their functions depend only on the law, which they interpret and apply to the concrete case according to their conscience, insofar as they find it conforms to the Constitution'”63.

The constitutionally oriented interpretation by ordinary judges has produced a significant transformation in the Italian constitutional justice system. As Mauro Cappelletti64 pointed out as early as 1968, there has been a progressive hybridisation between the Anglo-Saxon judicial review model65 and the centralised control system of Kelsenian matrix66. While in common law systems the control of constitutionality has progressively been concentrated in the Supreme Court through the binding nature of precedents, in the Italian system common judges have acquired an increasingly active role in constitutional interpretation67. This process has led to a situation in which, while formally maintaining a centralised system of control, ordinary judges can, in fact, “disapply rules deemed unconstitutional through the adaptive interpretation, without necessarily referring the matter to the Constitutional Court”68. While this development has made the protection of constitutional rights more flexible and immediate, it has also raised questions about legal certainty and the uniformity of constitutional interpretation, leading in more recent years to a partial refocusing of constitutionality review. This evolution of constitutionality review assumes relevance in the area of environmental protection, where the constitutionally oriented interpretation of civil procedural rules has made it possible to develop more effective and immediate means of protection. In fact, the dialogue between common judges and the Constitutional Court has helped to shape a procedural system in which environmental protection, elevated to a primary constitutional value by the 2022 reform, finds concrete ways of implementation through the adaptive interpretation of procedural rules. This process highlights how the re-centralisation of the review of constitutionality does not represent a return to the past, but rather a new phase of balancing the need for interpretative uniformity with the need to ensure effective and timely protection of environmental rights, in a perspective that increasingly looks to the protection of future generations.

The exploration of the fluid boundaries between public and private law in the context of globalization reveals a profound and ongoing transformation in the legal landscape. Hans Kelsen’s early critique of the ontological distinction between these two spheres, once considered radical, has gained renewed relevance as contemporary legal systems grapple with the complexities of modern society. Kelsen’s assertion that the division between public and private law is an artificial construct rather than an intrinsic reality of law resonates strongly today, as the boundaries between these domains continue to blur.

This erosion of traditional legal boundaries is evident across various dimensions. The constitutionalization of private law, the public regulation of markets, and the increasing use of private instruments in administrative actions all contribute to this phenomenon. Moreover, the growing influence of supranational legal sources further complicates the distinction, challenging the rigid categorizations that have historically defined legal systems. This shift reflects a broader trend towards hybridization, where public and private elements intertwine to address the multifaceted challenges of contemporary governance.

Central to this transformation is the imperative of environmental protection, which has emerged as a critical axis around which legal systems are reorienting. The integration of environmental considerations into legal frameworks underscores the necessity of transcending traditional dichotomies to address the pressing global challenges of climate change, biodiversity loss, and ecological degradation. The recognition of the environment as a primary constitutional value, as seen in recent legal reforms, highlights the need to balance individual rights with collective responsibilities, ensuring sustainable development for future generations.

Recent case law, particularly in Italy, illustrates this transformation. Judicial decisions have increasingly recognized the dynamic and functional nature of legal entities, moving away from static categorizations. The Italian Supreme Court’s emphasis on substance over form in qualifying entities and activities exemplifies this shift. Additionally, the integration of environmental protection into legal frameworks highlights the need for a holistic approach that transcends traditional dichotomies. The recognition of the environment as a primary constitutional value underscores the imperative to balance individual rights with collective responsibilities, ensuring sustainable development for future generations.

This evolution is not without its challenges. The complexity of social and economic relations demands flexible and adaptable legal instruments capable of overcoming the rigidity of traditional categorizations. The role of jurists, therefore, becomes crucial in crafting innovative solutions that harmonize public and private interests. This requires a dynamic interpretative approach guided by constitutional principles of solidarity and subsidiarity, fostering a legal system that effectively protects the rights and interests of the community.

The transformation of legal boundaries also necessitates a rethinking of the role of law in addressing contemporary issues such as environmental protection, economic inequality, and digital governance. As legal systems evolve, they must adapt to the realities of a globalized world, where traditional distinctions between public and private spheres are increasingly inadequate. This calls for a new legal grammar that embraces the complexity and interconnectedness of modern society, allowing for a more nuanced and responsive approach to governance.

In conclusion, the fluidity of legal boundaries in the age of globalization represents a necessary adaptation to the complexities of modern society. The hybridization of public and private law is not a loss of identity but a response to the evolving needs of governance. As legal systems continue to navigate this transformation, the focus must remain on developing a cohesive and integrated framework that addresses contemporary challenges while safeguarding fundamental rights and promoting social cohesion. The journey from dichotomy to dialogue marks a pivotal moment in legal history, offering a path towards a more inclusive and responsive legal order. This reimagining of legal boundaries is essential for ensuring that law remains a relevant and effective tool for addressing the pressing issues of our time, fostering a more just and equitable society for all.

  1. H. Kelsen, Public and Private Law, in Anthology of Public Law/2 (2024), pp. 5-22. First published: H.  Kelsen, Public and Private Law, in Riv. int. fil. fir. 1924. ↩︎
  2. G. Resta, Public law and private law: eulogy of Kelsenian inactuality, in Antologia di Diritto Pubblico/2 (2024), pp. 38-57 ↩︎
  3. Ibid. ↩︎
  4. Ibid. ↩︎
  5. Ibid. ↩︎
  6. L. Carasik, Renaissance or retrenchment: Legal education at a crossroads, in Ind. L. Rev., 44 (2010), pp. 735. ↩︎
  7. On this point see, ex multis, A. Pizzorusso, La comparazione giuridica e il diritto pubblico, in Il Foro Italiano, 102 (1979), pp. 131-132. ↩︎
  8. On this topic see ex multis: P. G. Alpa, Dal diritto pubblico al diritto privato, Mucchi, 2017 ; G. Alpa, Diritto privato e diritto pubblico. Una questione aperta, in ECONOMIA E DIRITTO DEL TERZIARIO ;/1999/2 (1999) L. R. Perfetti, Crepuscolo della distinzione tra diritto pubblico e privato? Starting with B. Sordi, Public Law and Private Law. Una genealogia storica, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2020, in PA Persona e Amministrazione, 11/2 (2022), pp. 895-915 ; G. A. Benacchio – M. Graziadei, Il declino della distinzione tra diritto pubblico e diritto privato. Proceedings of the IV SIRD National Congress. Trento, 24-26 September 2015, Vol. 24, University of Trento, 2016. ↩︎
  9. On this point, see: A. Torre, Common law: protagonists and ideas in the history of a legal system:(studies in memory of Francesco De Franchis), Vol. 10, Maggioli Editore, 2015 ↩︎
  10. Cf. Z. Gustavo, The Mild Law. Law, rights, justice ; (1992) S. Rodotà, Il diritto di avere diritti, Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa, 2012 ; P. G. Alpa, Dal diritto pubblico al diritto privato, cit. ↩︎
  11. S. Rodotà, Le fonti di integrazione del contratto, Rome TrE-Press, 2024. ↩︎
  12. On the notion of post-modern law see: G. Grisi – C. Salvi, A proposito del diritto post-moderno. Atti Seminario Leonessa, 22-23 September 2017, Vol. 12, Rome TrE-Press, 2018 ↩︎
  13. E. Pesce, Gli itinerari della buona fede secondo Stefano Rodotà, in Politica del diritto, 50/1 (2019), pp. 125-144 ↩︎
  14. H.-W. Micklitz, The visible hand of European private law in regulatory matters-The transformation of European private law from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation (2010) ↩︎
  15. P. G. Alpa, From Public to Private Law, cit. ↩︎
  16. S. Rodotà, Il diritto di avere diritti, cit. ↩︎
  17. Council of State Judgment No. 3041 of 2016. In this judgment of Palazzo Spada, it is pointed out that the notion of public entity in the Italian legal system is not fixed and immutable, but functional and changing. An entity may be qualified as a public body not in a static and formal manner, but in a dynamic and substantial manner, depending on the regulatory framework to which it is subject for the performance of certain activities. Therefore, the qualification of an entity as public does not depend on its formal status, but on its concrete subjection to obligations and duties, or prerogatives and powers, of a public nature according to the reference legislation. This also applies to legally recognised non-state universities, which, despite having certain publicity indicators, cannot be considered public bodies for the purposes of applying the transparency and publicity regulations set forth in Legislative Decree No. 33/2013. This conclusion is imposed by Article 33 of the Italian Constitution, which recognises the freedom of teaching and the right of entities and private individuals to establish schools and educational institutes, as well as by Article 1 of Law no. 243/1991, which provides for the applicability to non-state universities of the public regulations only within the limits of compatibility with the constitutional principle of pluralism and freedom of private initiative in the field of education. ↩︎
  18. Civil Cassation United Sections Order No 15911 of 6 June 2024. In this order, jurisdiction over the dispute relating to the termination or cessation due to expiry of the term of a contract of gratuitous loan of immovable property concluded between public administrations in the context of the liquidation procedure of the grantor body belongs to the ordinary judge and not to the administrative judge. The criterion for dividing jurisdiction between the ordinary judge and the administrative judge is based on the substantive petitum, i.e. on the nature of the subjective legal position invoked in the action, and not on the mere public status of the persons involved or on the generic involvement of public interests. When public administrations resort to negotiated instruments of private law, such as the commodate contract, to regulate their patrimonial relations, the dispute relating to the performance or termination of such a contract falls within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, since it is not the exercise of an administrative power that is at issue, but compliance with the agreed contractual regulation. The exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative court in the matter of agreements between public administrations, provided for by Article 133(1)(a)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, exists only when the dispute concerns the agreement itself and not purely pecuniary matters related thereto. Therefore, even if the commodation agreement were to fall within the notion of an ‘agreement between public administrations’, the dispute relating to its performance or termination would remain before the ordinary courts, since it does not concern the exercise of an administrative power. ↩︎
  19. Civil Cassation Sec. I Order No. 11265 of 11 June 2020. ↩︎
  20. Civil Cassation Sec. I Judgment No. 22209 of 27 September 2013. In order for local authorities to pursue the public interest through corporations, the legislature opted for a private instrument. This choice, however, implies that these companies assume the risks associated with their possible insolvency. Otherwise, it would violate the principles of equality and third-party reliance, as well as the rules on competition, which require equal treatment between market operators with identical structure and operating methods. ↩︎
  21. Constitutional Court judgment no. 152 of 26 July 2024. The subject matter of civil law, which falls within the exclusive legislative competence of the State pursuant to Article 117(2)(l) of the Italian Constitution, includes the regulation of legal entities governed by private law, including the determination of the types of controls that the public body may exercise over such entities. Therefore, the regional rules subjecting the exponential bodies of collective property, such as the agrarian participations, to the powers of direction, supervision and substitutive control provided for the bodies dependent on the Region, encroach on the State’s legislative competence in the field of civil law, since the Region cannot regulate the content and manner of exercising such controls. The ruling also stands out for having dealt with the delicate issue of legal persons under private law operating in the field of collective property, with particular reference to agrarian participations, outlining an important principle on the division of competences between State and Regions. In fact, the Court reiterated that the regulation of private legal persons, including public control mechanisms, falls within the exclusive legislative competence of the State, emphasising that environmental protection retains an essential core reserved to State legislation to ensure uniformity of treatment throughout the national territory.
    A particularly innovative aspect of the ruling concerns the interpretation of the principle of sustainable development, which is directly linked to the protection of future generations. This approach is manifested through an integrated vision that goes beyond the traditional conception of the environment as a mere limitation to economic initiative, to embrace a broader perspective that considers the environment as a shaping and integrating element of economic development. ↩︎
  22. Civil Cassation United Sez. Order No. 19452 of 15 July 2024 ↩︎
  23. Civil Cassation Sec. III Judgment No. 8826 of 3 April 2024 ↩︎
  24. The protection of rights in our legal system is articulated through different forms of legal protection, each with specific purposes and characteristics. Injunctive protection aims to prevent or stop unlawful conduct before it can produce or continue to produce damage, thus representing an instrument of preventive protection. Through an action for an injunction, the right holder can obtain a judicial measure ordering the subject to refrain from certain harmful conduct, thus preventing the violation from occurring or continuing. This form of protection is particularly effective in situations where it is necessary to intervene promptly in order to avoid damage that is difficult to repair.
    Compensatory protection, on the other hand, intervenes at a later stage, when the damage has already occurred, and is aimed at repairing the prejudice suffered through economic compensation. Compensation may be sought both for pecuniary damage, quantifiable in monetary terms, and for non-pecuniary damage, such as moral or existential damage. This form of protection aims to re-establish the economic equilibrium altered by the tort, placing the injured party in the situation he would have been in had the harmful event not occurred.
    Restorative protection, finally, is characterised by its aim of materially restoring the situation to the state prior to the violation of the right. Unlike compensatory protection, which offers economic compensation, restorative protection aims to concretely eliminate the effects of the wrongful act through the removal of the material changes produced by the harmful conduct. This form of protection is particularly relevant in areas such as the environment or construction, where it is possible and necessary to physically restore the state of the place.
    These different forms of protection are not alternatives but complementary, as they can also be used together to ensure more effective protection of rights. For example, in the case of environmental violations, it is possible to request either the immediate cessation of the polluting activity (prohibitory protection), or the restoration of the state of the place (restorative protection), or compensation for the damage already occurred (compensatory protection). The choice of the most appropriate form of protection depends on the nature of the right violated, the type of injury suffered and the objectives to be pursued through legal action.
    On this point see: A. di Majo, Forme e tecniche di tutela, in Il Foro Italiano, 112 (1989), pp. 131-132. ↩︎
  25. v. A. Russo, Gli strumenti proceduali di tutela collettiva in materia ambientale: un sistema multilivello di enforcement “integrato”(ed in progress) nella prospettiva interna e transnazionale, in Tesi di Dottorato, XXXVI Ciclo, Università di Padova (2024) ↩︎
  26. Article 42 Italian Constitution:
    Property is public or private. Economic property belongs to the state, to entities or to private persons.
    Private property is recognised and guaranteed by law, which determines the ways in which it may be acquired, enjoyed and its limits in order to ensure its social function and to make it accessible to all.
    Private property may, in cases provided for by law, and subject to compensation, be expropriated for reasons of general interest.
    The law lays down the rules and limits of legitimate and testamentary succession and the rights of the State over inheritances. ↩︎
  27. Article 43 Italian Constitution:
    For purposes of general utility, the law may originally reserve
    or transfer, by expropriation and subject to compensation, to the State, public entities or communities of workers or users certain undertakings or categories of undertakings, which relate to essential public services or energy sources or monopolistic situations and are of overriding general interest. ↩︎
  28. Decreto legislativo 19 agosto 2016, n. 175. Testo unico in materia di società a partecipazione pubblica
    For the details of the entire operative part of this article, please refer to the Consolidated Text. ↩︎
  29. S. Rodotà, Il diritto di avere diritti, cit. ↩︎
  30. P. G. Alpa, Dal diritto pubblico al diritto privato, cit. ↩︎
  31. Civil Cassation Sec. III Order No. 7513 of 27 March 2018. ↩︎
  32. L. D’Apollo, Danno biologico risarcito secondo le tabelle, Vol. 31, Maggioli Editore, 2010 ↩︎
  33. See footnote 24 ↩︎
  34. Council of State Judgment No 4614 of 2017 ↩︎
  35. Civil cassation Sez. Unite sentence no. 3665 of 14 February 2011. The judgment in question, referring to the Venetian fishing valleys, states that the Constitution (Articles 2, 9, 42) protects human personality and its development in the welfare state, including the protection of the landscape. This protection is not limited to state property or state assets, but extends to all those assets that, by nature or destination, serve the collective interest, regardless of a specific legislative classification. Their ‘commonality’ prevails over the issue of ownership, making the state-owned aspect secondary to their social function.
    With regard to public property, state ownership indicates a dual ownership: to the community and to the public body that represents it. Ownership is not mere ownership, but a service: the entity must guarantee the conservation of the characteristics of the asset and its public enjoyment. Therefore, state property (both state and local) implies governance obligations to ensure the effective public enjoyment of the asset. ↩︎
  36. Constitutional Court Judgment No. 85 of 9 May 2013 ↩︎
  37. Civil Cassation Sec. I Judgment No. 14657 of 29 May 2019. The judgment establishes a fundamental principle: the illegitimate occupation of property by the public administration, regardless of whether it is qualified as usurpative or acquisitive, always constitutes a civil tort (Article 2043 of the Civil Code) and entitles the party to compensation for damages. Jurisprudence has abandoned the interpretation according to which an unlawful activity of the public administration could result in the loss of private property. Now, the general scheme of Articles 2043 and 2058 of the Civil Code applies, granting the owner real and precautionary protection, in addition to compensation, without the administration acquiring the property. The distinction between usurpative and acquisitive occupation is therefore superseded: in both cases, the illegitimate action of the public administration deprives the private party of property without transferring it to the administration. Finally, mere prolonged detention or acts of possession are not sufficient for usucapation; explicit material actions of opposition against the owner-possessor are required. ↩︎
  38. Civil Cassation Sec. I Judgment No. 16741 of 23 July 2014 ↩︎
  39. Civil Cassation United Sez. Order No. 25038 of 7 November 2013 ↩︎
  40. Civil Cassation Sec. III Judgment No. 21255 of 17 September 2013 ↩︎
  41. Criminal Cassation Sec. V Judgment No. 4675 of 30 January 2014 ↩︎
  42. Article inserted by Law No. 68 of 22 May 2015, which inserted the entire Title VI-bis, as from 29 May 2015 regulating ‘Crimes against the environment’ (Articles 452-bis – 452-terdecies). ↩︎
  43. Council of State Judgment No. 3041 of 2016. Importantly, “The notion of public entity in the Italian legal system is not fixed and immutable, but functional and changing. An entity may be qualified as a public body not in a static and formal manner, but in a dynamic and substantial manner, depending on the regulatory framework to which it is subject for the performance of certain activities. Therefore, the qualification of an entity as public does not depend on its formal status, but on the concrete subjection of the same to obligations and duties, or to prerogatives and powers, of a public nature according to the reference legislation.” ↩︎
  44. Constitutional Court Judgment No. 126 of 1 June 2016 ↩︎
  45. Constitutional Court Judgment No. 105 of 13 June 2024 ↩︎
  46. It is only necessary to specify the full implementation in the environmental field since, despite the important constitutional innovation and the jurisprudential evolution on the subject, the absence of a specific state law that fully implements the reservation of law provided for in Article 9 of the Constitution persists, leaving the animal protection system still fragmented and based mainly on sectoral and local regulatory interventions. ↩︎
  47. Council of State Judgment No. 1823 of 2023 ↩︎
  48. Constitutional Court Judgment No. 152 of 26 July 2024 ↩︎
  49. Constitutional Court Judgment No. 105 of 13 June 2024 ↩︎
  50. Principle of environmental action
    1. The protection of the environment and natural ecosystems and the
    cultural heritage must be guaranteed by all public and private entities and public or private natural and legal persons, through appropriate action that is informed by the principles of precaution, preventive action, correction, as a priority at source, of damage caused to the environment, as well as the ‘polluter pays’ principle, which, pursuant to Article 174(2) of the Treaty of the European Unions, govern the Community’s policy on the environment. ↩︎
  51. Principle of sustainable development
    1. Any human activity that is legally relevant within the meaning of
    this code must comply with the principle of sustainable development to ensure that the satisfaction of the needs of present generations cannot compromise the quality of life and possibilities of future generations.
    2. The activity of the public administration must also be
    aimed at enabling the best possible implementation of the principle of sustainable development, whereby in the comparative choice of public and private interests characterised by discretion, the interests of environmental protection and cultural heritage must be given priority consideration.
    3. Given the complexity of the relationships and interferences between
    nature and human activities, the principle of sustainable development must make it possible to identify a balanced relationship, within the inherited resources, between those to be saved and those to be passed on, so that the principle of solidarity to safeguard and to improve the quality of the environment in the future as well is also included in the dynamics of production and consumption.
    4. The resolution of issues involving environmental aspects
    must be sought and found from the perspective of ensuring sustainable development, so as to safeguard the proper functioning and evolution of natural ecosystems from negative modifications that may be produced by human activities. ↩︎
  52. Constitutional Court Judgment No. 126 of 1 June 2016 ↩︎
  53. Environmental damage
    1. Environmental damage is any significant and measurable impairment, direct or indirect, of a natural resource or the utility provided by it.
    2. Within the meaning of Directive 2004/35/EC, environmental damage is the deterioration, in comparison with the original conditions, caused:
    a) alle specie e agli habitat naturali protetti dalla normativa nazionale e comunitaria di cui alla legge 11 febbraio 1992, n. 157, recante norme per la protezione della fauna selvatica, che recepisce le direttive 79/409/CEE del Consiglio del 2 aprile 1979; 85/411/CEE della Commissione del 25 luglio 1985 e 91/244/CEE della Commissione del 6 marzo 1991 ed attua le convenzioni di Parigi del 18 ottobre 1950 e di Berna del 19 settembre 1979, e di cui al decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 8 settembre 1997, n. 357 of 8 September 1997, on the regulation implementing Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, as well as the protected natural areas referred to in Law No. 394 of 6 December 1991, and subsequent implementing rules;
    (b) inland waters, through actions that have a significantly negative impact on:
    (1) the ecological, chemical or quantitative status or ecological potential of the waters concerned, as defined in Directive 2000/60/EC, with the exception of adverse effects to which Article 4(7) of that Directive applies, or
    (2) the environmental status of the marine waters concerned, as defined in Directive 2008/56/EC, to the extent that particular aspects of the environmental status of the marine environment are not already addressed in Directive 2000/60/EC;
    (c) coastal waters and waters within the territorial sea through the above actions, even if carried out in international waters;
    (d) to land, through any contamination that creates a significant risk of harmful effects, including indirect effects, on human health as a result of the introduction of substances, preparations, organisms or micro-organisms harmful to the environment into the soil, ground or subsoil. ↩︎
  54. Determination of measures for the compensation of environmental damage and environmental restoration of sites of national interest.
    1. Unless the settlement takes place in court in accordance with article 185 of the code of civil procedure, in compliance with the criteria set forth in paragraph 2 and taking into account the common framework to be complied with as set forth in annex 3 to this part six, the subject against whom the Ministry of the Environment and of the Protection of the Land and the Sea has started the procedures for the reclamation and restoration of environmental damage of polluted sites of national interest pursuant to article 18 of law no. 349 of 8 July 1986, article 17 of legislative decree no. 22 of 5 February 1997, and pursuant to title V of part four and part six of this decree, or has taken the relevant legal action, shall be entitled to receive the settlement. 349 of 8 July 1986, Article 17 of Legislative Decree no. 22 of 5 February 1997, and pursuant to Title V of Part Four and Part Six of this Decree, or has commenced the relevant legal proceedings, may make an administrative settlement proposal. ↩︎
  55. Civil cassation Sec. III order no. 23647 of 27 October 2020. Specifically, let us see how environmental damage, as a lesion of a public good of constitutional relevance, entails the civil liability of the person who caused it, by way of fault or danger, based on the principles set forth in Articles 2043 and 2050 of the Italian Civil Code and Article 18 of Law no. 349/1986. This liability also extends to the managers and employees of the company owning the polluting plant, by reason of their causal contribution, and translates into the obligation to compensate the damage in a specific form or by pecuniary equivalent, depending on the possibility of restoring the state of the places. The judge, in assessing the gravity of the damage and the extent of the compensation, must take into account the constitutional relevance of the good of the environment, the duration and extent of the pollution, as well as the possible intentional or grossly negligent conduct of those responsible. The precautionary principle also requires consideration of potential and future damage that has not yet actually occurred, provided that it can be foreseen on the basis of available scientific knowledge. The ascertainment of liability and the quantification of the compensation must be carried out with rigour and on the basis of a complete technical investigation, without any prescriptions or limitations of liability provided for by the sector legislation being relevant, since environmental damage constitutes an autonomous and prevailing case of tort under civil law with respect to special disciplines. ↩︎
  56. Civil Cassation Sec. III Judgment No. 8468 of 27 March 2019 ↩︎
  57. Cf. paragraph 5: within the time limits laid down in paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 2947 of the Civil Code, the Minister for the Environment and the Protection of Land and Sea may take further measures against subsequently identified offenders. ↩︎
  58. Ministerial competences in the first 3 paragraphs of the article:
    1. The Minister for the Environment and the Protection of Land and Sea shall exercise the functions and tasks incumbent on the State with regard to the protection, prevention and repair of damage to the environment.
    2. Ministerial action normally takes place in cooperation with the regions, local authorities and any public law entity deemed appropriate.
    3. Ministerial action shall be carried out in compliance with the existing Community legislation on the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, the competences of the regions, the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano and the local authorities with the application of the constitutional principles of subsidiarity and loyal cooperation. ↩︎
  59. Equitable assessment of damages.
    If the precise amount of the harm cannot be proven, it shall be assessed by the court on an equitable basis. ↩︎
  60. Regional Administrative Court of Lombardy – Milan Judgment No. 1957 of 2013 ↩︎
  61. Civil Cassation Sec. III Judgment No. 9012 of 6 May 2015 ↩︎
  62. M. Cirulli, Sull’interpretazione costituzionalmente orientata delle norme proceduali civili, in JUDICIUM (2024), pp. 1-21 ↩︎
  63. Ibid. ↩︎
  64. The anastatically reprinted 1968 edition is cited here: M. Cappelletti, Il controllo giudiziario di costituzionalità delle leggi nel diritto comparato, Rome TrE-Press, 2024 ↩︎
  65. On this point see, ex multis: M. Gobbo, La funzione consultiva delle Corti negli ordinamenti anglosassoni, Vol. 9, CLUEB/Cooperativa Libraria Universitaria Editrice Bologna: via Marsala 31, I…, 2007 ↩︎
  66. On this point see, ex multis: L. Pegoraro, ‘Political’ and ‘jurisdictional’ a hundred years after the Verfassungsgerichtshof, in Comparative and European Public Law, 22/4 (2020), pp. 903-930 ↩︎
  67. M. Cirulli, Sull’interpretazione costituzionalmente orientata delle norme proceduali civili, cit. ↩︎
  68. Ibid. ↩︎